Coaching Leaders: Guiding People Who Guide Others
Author: Daniel Whit
Coaching Leaders is written for coaches who are in the challenging position of working with leaders and helping them excel as the top executives and managers in their organizations. The book is filled with illustrative examples from Daniel White’s practice as a successful executive coach. His clients’ stories reveal the human drama of becoming a leader and explore the courageous and fascinating accomplishments these individuals have achieved in order to grow professionally. These stories also clearly show how a skilled coach adjusts to meet an individual client’s personality and targeted challenge. Coaching Leaders includes a wide variety of effective coaching concepts and the information needed to guide leaders and help them maintain the motivation to change; battle anxiety, fear, and resistance; and achieve emotional intelligence.
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Contract Theory
Author: Patrick Bolton
Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.
The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
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